Prof. David Schultz on War, International Law & How the War in Ukraine May End - MRU
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30 December, 2022
Prof. David Schultz on War, International Law & How the War in Ukraine May End
MRUen
MRU LAB

What will be the end of the war in Ukraine?

While some argue that the model of a divided Korea is a possible outcome for Ukraine, a situation similar to that of a partitioned Germany in the 20th century is equally likely.

A divided Korea was an establishment of a war that technically never ended. The Korean War may have been the first major Cold War conflict. The fight between North and South was a proxy fight among China, the USSR, and the United States. The military advantage had been shifting back and forth from 1950 to 1953. Eventually, all sides wearied from the fight, culminated in an armistice that simply declared a temporary end to the fighting. It left the nation divided and with no resolution of mutual claims. Nearly 70 years later, the two Koreas persist as one of the last Cold War flashpoints, with the constant threat of a renewal of hostilities. It is a state between peace and war.

This could be the fate of Ukraine. However, unlike Korea, there is no legal principle supporting Russia. The annexation of Crimea, Donbas, and Luhansk in 2014 was illegal under international law. The Russian invasion and annexation of four regions of Ukraine in 2022 is similarly illegal under international law, which declares that states renounce the use of force to resolve disagreements, including determination of state borders. International law makes Russia’s actions clearly illegal, keeping in mind that Ukraine is entitled to all of its lost territory. Yet justice does not always prevail, and there is no indication that Russia and Vladimir Putin will voluntarily retreat and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Neither Ukraine nor Russia has an interest or incentive to end the War. For Russia and Putin, it is about maintaining the zone of influence. It is about national pride. It is the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ with a Russian accent. The War is not going successfully and the Russian elite, including Putin, does not want to admit defeat. Putin has made victory in Ukraine a test of his personal will and the legitimacy of his rule may now be tied to the war. Putin is determined to pump more money, arms, and soldiers into the war, in order to inflict more damage on Ukrainians in the hope of breaking their will to fight or beating them into submission. Perhaps at some point, Russia, as a supposed superpower, can outlast the weaker opponent.

Moreover, some other countries, such as China, do not want Russia to lose. Considering that the U.S., NATO, and the European Union support Ukraine, it is a test of West versus East, or democracy versus authoritarianism. If Russia were to lose, what of China’s claims to Taiwan?

For Ukraine, the U.S., and the West, it is partly a war of principle to uphold the post-WW2 international order. For Ukraine, it is a battle of survival, of national identity, and the right of self-determination to join Europe. For others in Europe, losing Ukraine means further Russian encroachment. Additionally, the U.S. sees this as an opportunity to weaken Russia, with the added incentive of a drawn-out war hastening what is seen as Russia’s inevitable long-term decline.

There is no game plan for peace. There is no game plan for victory. There is no incentive to end the hostilities. The fighting could go on for years, but probably will not. At some point, active fighting will end. But how? Yes, one can see either side achieving the military victory, but the odds are against this option.

In September, I was at a conference in Lithuania to promote my new book, “Europe Alone: Small State Security without the United States”. The book analyses the role the U.S. has played since WW2 in European security needs. Among the contributors were scholars from the Lithuanian Military Academy. One of them said then that the fight will go on until the two sides agree to stop. They will not agree to peace. They will not resolve their disagreements, and they will not agree to legitimate and permanent territorial boundaries. Moscow and Kyiv will fight to get as much land as possible before declaring a truce.

This may be Ukraine’s fate. It is not clear, whether by that point Ukraine will have reconquered Crimea, Donbas, and other annexed regions. But the lines drawn then will be the basis of division between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine and East Ukraine, or the Republic of Ukraine and the People’s Republic of Ukraine. The names are not clear, but Ukraine may become a divided state.

Ukraine can be divided similarly to what we see on the Korean peninsula, where territorial claims have not been resolved and the threat of war breaking out at any moment is always present. Welcome to the new hot peace or cold war.

Another answer is a short-term divided West and East Ukraine. The former will be an EU member state, and possibly a NATO member. It will prosper like West Germany, while the remainder of Russian-occupied Ukraine will experience the fate of East Germany. One nation, two states, and temporarily divided on a permanent basis. Russia will not have to declare defeat, but it will be vastly weakened. Ukraine wrongly loses territory, but West Ukraine gets stronger and prospers as a result. Eventually with a weakened Russia, unable to support its client states, much like the former USSR was unable to, the client state of East Ukraine gets absorbed by its stronger neighbour – West Ukraine.

Thus, the question is, will the end of the war be similar to Korea or Germany, and how long will it take to get the answer?

Prof. David Schultz, the author of this article, is a member of the MRU Justice LAB and an author of the recently published book, "Europe Alone: Small State Security without the United States”.  He is a well-known expert on U.S. elections and is a professor at Hamline University in Minnesota.